Fifty years ago, Harsanyi published the first of his seminal two papers on utilitarianism. His results were derived within the von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility theory. A year later, Savage incorporated subjective probability into expected utility theory in his famous book. In this note we extend Harsanyi's utilitarianism to Savage's framework. We show that a Pareto condition implies utilitarian aggregation: both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals. This conclusion contrasts the impossibility of reconciling a Pareto condition and linear aggregation of beliefs and tastes, that was noted by several authors. We argue that the indiscriminate Pareto condition considered by these authors is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows the extension of Harsanyi's result to Savage's framework.
1 Introduction Harsanyi (1955) offered an axiomatic justification of utilitarianism. He has assumed that all individuals in society as well as society itself are vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility maximizers (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) ). In this model, one Pareto indifference condition implies that the utility function of society is a linear combination of the utility functions of individuals in society.
The vNM framework deals with a single individual facing lotteries over outcomes. The use of this framework in Harsanyi's social choice model presupposes that all individuals face the same lotteries, that is, they agree on the probabilities of any given lottery. Thus individuals differ only in their preferences but not in their beliefs. This, however, is rather restrictive. While divergence of opinions is sometimes the result of different values assigned by different individuals to outcomes, much of it is due to differences in beliefs (i.e., different probability distributions over states of nature). Everyone wants peace and prosperity, but people have very different views about the way to achieve these common goals.
In order to examine utilitarian aggregationà la Harsanyi in the more general case where individuals have different beliefs, a framework such as Savage's (1954) is required. In this framework, an individual has a utility function over a set of consequences, and a (subjective) probability over events. The individual is assumed to have preferences over acts, which are functions from states of the world to consequences. These preferences can be represented by maximization of subjective expected utility, that is, the expectation of the utility function with respect to the subjective probability.
In this work we assume that each individual in society, as well as society itself, has preferences over acts, and that these preferences are representable by subjective expected utility as in Savage's model. Acts represent social alternatives. We show that an appropriate generalization of Harsanyi's Pareto indifference condition to the present framework implies that society's utility function is a linear aggregation of individual's utilities, and similarly society's belief is a linear aggregation of individuals' beliefs.
Our result stands in contrast to the conclusion of the works that have studied utilitarian aggregation in Savage-like models. Several authors have found that such an aggregation, generalizing Harsanyi's theorem, is impossible when Pareto and nondictatorial conditions are imposed (Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) , Mongin (1995) ). Moreover, impossibility results have also been recently obtained for more general classes of preferences (Mongin (1998) and Blackorby et al. (2000) ). Mongin (1995) was the first to formalize Harsanyi's utilitarianism in a full fledged Savage's model with an additional assumption of countable additivity of the subjective probabilities. We use here the same model. We argue, however, that the impossibility results are derived from a counter-intuitive axiom. Further, an appropriate weakening of this axiom leads to a possibility result.
The Pareto condition that drives the impossibility of aggregation requires that if all individuals in society agree on preferences between two alternatives, so should society. Despite its apparently innocent formulation, we do not find this condition very plausible in a model incorporating subjective beliefs, as the following example shows.
Two gentlemen agree to fight a duel at dawn, although either can back down. The result of a duel is that one wins and the other loses (fatally). The gentlemen have opposite rankings of the three consequences: (1 wins and 2 loses), (no duel), and (2 wins and 1 loses). Assume, for example, that the cardinal rankings of these consequences are (1, 0, −5) for the first gentleman and (−5, 0, 1) for the second. The fact that both prefer duel to no duel, in spite of their opposite taste for the consequences, is possible only because they hold contradictory beliefs. Each of them believes, with a probability of at least 85%, that he will win the duel. The combination of very different utility functions and very different subjective probabilities yields the same preferences. If they had similar beliefs, a duel would not take place.
A straightforward adaptation of Pareto's condition implies that society should rank duel above no duel, as both prefer it. Indeed, so do the Pareto axioms used to obtain impossibility results. But we claim that the Pareto condition cannot serve as an argument for society to prefer that a duel take place.
Observe that we do not argue that a duel should not take place. A liberal approach might suggest that society should have no preferences at all over issues such as the duel. Moreover, even if one takes a more paternalistic approach, according to which society does have a complete preference relation, society might favor a duel for a variety of reasons. We only argue that the Pareto condition cannot be one of them.
Consider, first, the following example. Mary has to choose between two cups containing hot drinks. She believes that the first contains coffee and the second -tea, and, given her strong preference for coffee, she prefers the first cup. No other individual is affected by this choice. Hence all other individuals are indifferent between Mary's two choices. But everyone else is convinced that Mary is in fact wrong, and that the contents of the cups are reversed. Society may refrain from expressing preferences over Mary's two choices. But if society does have such preferences, we find that basing them on a formal application of the Pareto condition is unjustified.
By a similar token, the duel is preferred by both gentlemen only because they differ in their beliefs. Society cannot, perhaps, judge who is more accurate in his probability assessments. But it is evident that at least one of them is wrong: every probability assessment would induce at least one of the gentlemen to back down. In this situation, we argue, the Pareto condition cannot serve as a reason for society to prefer that a duel take place.
Our duel example is similar to an example in Raiffa (1968) , suggesting the rejection of the Pareto condition in the face of contradictory beliefs. Raiffa deals with aggregation of the opinions of different experts. These experts are consulted about both the desirability of outcomes and the plausibility of scenarios. Thus, each expert provides a utility function and a probability measure. Raiffa notes that it might well be the case that all experts will prefer alternative a over b, while b will be preferred to a if one adopts the average utility function and the average probability measure. Thus, Raiffa (1968) argues against the Pareto condition whenever it contradicts expected utility maximization with respect to average utility and average probability. By contrast, we argue that the Pareto condition is unpalatable without reference to a particular method of aggregation. Moreover, whereas Raiffa deals with a single decision maker, who is unsure about the measurement of utility and of probability, our focus is on social welfare, where conflict of interest is inherent. Thus, in Raiffa's problem one may be "wrong" both about probabilities and about utilities, whereas in the social welfare set-up only probabilities admit a notion of correctness.
In this note we suggest a weaker Pareto condition, which is more plausible in a model that separates tastes and beliefs. With this condition a nondictatorial separate aggregation of tastes and of beliefs,à la Harsanyi, is possible. Our Pareto condition is restricted to alternatives in which individuals may differ only in their tastes and not in their beliefs. More specifically, an alternative is said to be a lottery if all individuals agree on the distribution of outcomes induced by this alternative. We require that if all individuals are indifferent between two alternatives, which are lotteries in our sense, then society too is indifferent between them. Note that if such an alternative has finitely many consequences, it corresponds to a classical vNM lottery. Thus, by Harsanyi's theorem, our Pareto condition implies that society's utility function is a linear combination of the utility functions of the individuals.
More surprisingly, this condition also implies that the probability measure of society is a linear combination of those of the individuals. Conversely, our Pareto condition is satisfied whenever society's utility is a linear combination of the individuals' utilities and society's probability measure is a linear combination of those of the individuals.
In conclusion, we argue that the impossibility theorems result from a Pareto condition that is far from compelling. It is based on the requirement that society approves unanimous preferences of individuals, even when unanimity is the result of conflicting tastes and conflicting beliefs. Our Pareto condition restricts social approval of unanimity only to those cases where all individuals have identical beliefs. This seems to be the natural extension of Harsanyi's utilitarianism for the expected utility model to that of subjective expected utility.
To the extent that theoretical results may serve as rhetorical devices, we find the present result encouraging. The alternative, namely the theoretical conclusion that aggregating tastes and beliefs is impossible, is troubling. If there is, indeed, no way to aggregate preferences of all individuals, then a ruling party or a president may feel exempted from seeking to represent society in its entirety even if elected by an incidental majority. This seems to contradict our moral intuition on this issue, which demands that a majority should not disregard opinions and desires of minorities. Moreover, ignoring minorities may lead to instability and inefficiency in a society where governments shift frequently between opposing parties. However, we argue that the impossibility results cannot be cited as an indirect justification of ignoring minority views, because they rely on a counter-intuitive assumption. By contrast, a more intuitive version of this assumption necessitates aggregation of preferences.
2
The next section presents the main result, while Section 3 contains the proof.
The Main Result
Let (S, Σ) be a σ-measurable space, where S is a set of states (of nature), and Σ is a σ-algebra of events. Denote by X a set of outcomes endowed with a σ-algebra. The set A = {a | a: S → X, a is Σ − measurable} is the set of alternatives (or acts in Savage's terminology). Society is a set of individuals N = {1, ..., n}. Individual i ∈ N has preferences i ⊂ A × A, whereas society's preferences are denoted 0 ⊂ A × A. For 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the relations ∼ i and i are defined as the symmetric and asymmetric parts of i , as usual. We assume that each of preference relations is represented by expected utility maximization, that is, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n there are a measurable and bounded utility function u i : X → R and a probability measure λ i on Σ such that, for every a,
We assume that, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, λ i is countably additive and non-atomic, and that u i is not constant.
Thus, an event E is in Λ when all individuals agree on its probability.
An alternative a is a lottery if for each measurable subset of outcome, Y , a −1 (Y ) ∈ Λ. Thus, in a lottery all individuals agree on the probability of the events that are involved in the definition of the lottery. Note the formal difference between lotteries as defined here and vNM lotteries over X. The latter are probability distributions over X (with finite support) while the first are measurable functions. Nevertheless, it is easy to show that finitely-valued lotteries, as defined here, can be identified with vNM lotteries over X. This is done in Claim 4 in the proof of the Theorem. The restricted Pareto condition: For all lotteries a and b, if for every
This theorem does not restrict the coefficients used in the linear combinations that define beliefs and tastes of society, exept that the sum of the coefficients of λ 0 is 1 since λ i (S) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. One may wish to augment our condition to obtain results according to which λ 0 and u 0 are convex combinations of
, respectively, or even convex combinations with positive coefficients. Harsanyi (1955) introduced conditions guaranteeing that society's utility function is a convex combination of individuals' utility functions, or a convex combination with strictly positive coefficients. Similarly, Mongin (1995) introduced conditions that imply that society's probability measure is a convex function of individuals' probability measures, or a convex combination with strictly positive coefficients. Harsanyi's and Mongin's conditions can be directly adapted to our framework, with the same implications. For brevity's sake, we do not spell out these conditions here.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of the Theorem: The restricted Pareto condition is sufficient. Assume that this condition holds. We prove, first, that the condition implies that λ 0 is a linear combination of
, with coefficients summing to 1. Next, we show that this implies also that u 0 is a linear combination of Proposition 3 in Mongin (1995) states that, under the conclusion of Claim 1, λ 0 is a linear combination of {λ i } n i=1 with coefficients summing to 1.. The following two claims constitute a shorter proof of this fact, and are given here for the sake of completeness. Claim 2: For every z ∈ Z there exists a unique z 0 = z 0 (z) such that (z 0 , z) ∈Ẑ. Proof: Assume thatẑ = (z 0 , z) andŵ = (w 0 , z) are inẐ, with z 0 < w 0 . Sinceλ(S)−ŵ ∈Ẑ, it follows from the convexity ofẐ that (w), w) . By the convexity ofẐ, βẑ + (1 − β)ŵ ∈Ẑ. The first coordinate of this point is βz 0 (z) + (1 − β)z 0 (w). The last n coordinates are βz +(1−β)w, and thus the result follows by Claim 2. By Claim 3, z 0 (z) is a linear function on Z. Linearity together with the fact that z 0 (z) = 0 imply the existence of (θ i ) i∈N in R N such that z 0 (z) = i∈N θ i z i . Hence, for each event E, λ 0 (E) = i∈N θ i λ i (E). Substituting S for E in the last equality we conclude that i∈N θ i = 1. Now we show that u 0 is a linear combination of
. We first recall a well-known conclusion of the Lyapunov Theorem (proved by induction).
Claim 4: Assume that p 1 , ...p m are non-negative numbers whose sum is 1. Then there is a partition of S, (E 1 , ...E m ) such that, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m λ(E j ) = p j λ(S).
Using Claim 4 we can identify finitely-valued lotteries with vNM lotteries over X. Specifically, given a vNM lottery L with a finite support over X, one may use Claim 4 to construct a lottery a ∈ A such that L is the distribution on X defined by a. Moreover, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, all such lotteries a are ∼ i -equivalent since they have the same expected utility. Conversely, any finitely-valued lottery a ∈ A defines a distribution over X, which is a vNM lottery.
It follows that, restricting { i } 0≤i≤n to lotteries in A one may apply Harsanyi's (1955) 
